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AMENDING THE UNIFORM COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCE
OF CONVICTION ACT

by Stephen A. Saltz burg

Introduction
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (also known
as The Uniform Law Commission) approved
and amended the Uniform Collateral Con-

sequences of Conviction Act in

20

0

.1

The

Commission recognized that burdens imposed on individuals convicted for violation of federal and state criminal laws often
made it difficult for those individuals to successfully re-enter society after serving their
criminal sentences. The Commission wrote:
The growth of the
convicted population means
that there are literally millions of people being released
from incarceration, probation
and parole supervision every
year. They must successfully
reintegrate into society or be
at risk for recidivism. Society
has a strong interest in preventing recidivism. An individual who could have successfully reentered society
but for avoidable cause reoffends generates the financial
and human costs of the new
crime, expenditure of law en1
Uniform Collateral Consequences of Convictions
Act, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (amended 2010) [the Act] availableat http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/collateralconsequences/ucca_final_10.pdf

forcement, judicial and corrections resources, and the
loss of the productive work
that the individual could
have contributed to the economy. Society also has a strong
interest in seeing that individuals convicted of crimes
can regain the legal status of
ordinary citizens to prevent
the creation of a permanent
class of "internal exiles" who
cannot establish themselves
as law-abiding and productive members of the community.

[It] has become increasingly
difficult to avoid or mitigate
the impact of collateral consequences. Most states have
not yet developed a comprehensive and effective way of
"neutralizing" the effect of a
conviction in cases where it
is not necessary or appropriate for it to be decisive. In
almost every U.S. jurisdiction, offenders seeking to put
their criminal past behind
them are frustrated by a legal
system that is complex and
unclear and entirely inad-
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The Commission accurately identified
the problems that collateral consequences
pose for any person seeking to resume a normal life after being convicted of a crime and
after serving the criminal penalty a jurisdiction exacts as a consequence of the conviction.
The reality for many is that they continue to
pay for their crimes without the normal players in the criminal justice system being aware
of the impact of collateral consequences. The
prosecutor and criminal defense counsel finish
their work once a conviction becomes final and
a defendant is placed under the control of either a court in the form of judicially supervised
probation or a correctional system in either jail
or prison. The court generally finishes its work
when a defendant completes probation, and
the correctional system finishes its work when
a convicted defendant is finally released from
incarceration and completes any post-incarceration period of parole or supervised release.
Having accurately identified the problems confronting a convicted person seeking to
re-enter a community, the Commission makes
the following assertion: "[t]he criminal justice
system must pay attention to collateral consequences. If the sentence is a reliable indicator,
collateral consequences in many instances are
what is really at stake, the real point of achieving
a conviction."' The Commission's reasoning for
this assertion is based on the fact that in 2004,
6o% of individuals convicted of felonies in
state courts were not sentenced to prison. Instead, 3o% of those individuals were sentenced
to probation or other non-incarceration alterId. at 1-4. The Prefatory Note is not part of the
2
legislation that the Commission recommends to the states, but
it does purport to set forth the justifications for that legislation. It remains on the Commission's website and presumably
represents the Commission's official position on the rationales

for the Act.
Id. at 4.
3
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natives, and the other 3 o% received jail rather
than prison terms. This, according to the Commission, means that "[in a high percentage of
cases, the real work of the legal system is done
not by fine or imprisonment, but by changing the legal status of convicted individuals."
Many collateral consequences of conviction are unnecessary and could actually have
the perverse effect of encouraging convicted
individuals to pursue additional criminal acts
once they discover that many lawful means of
supporting themselves and their families are
unavailable to them. But the Commission's assertion as to "the real point of achieving a conviction" can be read two ways, and neither interpretation finds support in the data relied on
by the Commission. One way to read the assertion is that the Commission contends that the
criminal justice system is not set up to protect
public safety, deter crime, encourage rehabili
tation and discourage recidivism, and is actually intended to create a second class category
of people, by convicting them of criminal acts
and relegating them forever to second class status. Such a stretch would cast doubt on the
motives of not only legislators throughout the
country, but also on lawyers and judges who
participate in the criminal justice system in the
belief that it serves legitimate penal purposes.
-

.

equate to the task. As a practical matter, in most jurisdictions people convicted of a
crime have no hope of ever
being able to fully discharge
their debt to society ...

The other reading of "the real point
of achieving a conviction" is the notion that
probation, and perhaps jail sentences rather
than prison sentences, are not really punishments imposed on individuals. However, this
notion reflects a misunderstanding of punishment. After all, when a court puts an individual on probation, there typically are conditions that restrict the individual's former
freedom. Probation is not a pass. It is a serious status that requires behavioral modification and threatens revocation and incarceration as the consequences of violating probation
conditions. Similarly, when an individual is
sentenced to jail rather than prison, the individual is incarcerated, not sent off to summer camp. The fact is that states may be wise
4

Id.
2
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ak
,IF

THE COMMSSON ACCURATELY DENTFED THE PROBLEMS THAT
COLLATERAL CONSEUENCES POSE FOR ANY PERSON SENG TO
RESUME A NORMAL LIFE AFTER BEING CONVICTE OF ACRIME AND
WHATEVER CRIMINAL PENALTY A JURISDICTIN EXACTS AS A
CONSEQUENCE OF CONVICTION.
when they determine that punishment short
of prison may accomplish the goals of criminal justice and that such punishment is often
commensurate with the relatively minor conduct that our society so often has criminalized.

out the United States and affords legislators a
ready vehicle for re-examination and reform.'
The Act provides a starting place for
interested legislators, but it has become clear
that the Act needs further work if it is to adequately deal with the problems associated
with collateral consequences. Below, I suggest some of the changes that should be made.

Perhaps the greatest problem with the
Commission's analysis is the assumption that
the intent of lawmakers is to impose collateral consequences as a punishment. The reality in many cases is that well-intentioned Defining Collateral Consequence
lawmakers use collateral consequences as
The Commission states in its Prefatory
a means of protecting society without beNote to the Act that "[t]he term 'collateral sancing fully aware of how many collateral consetion' is used here to mean a legal disability that
quences they have imposed and how sweepoccurs by operation of law because of a coning the effects can be for those whom the
viction but is not part of the sentence for the
collateral consequences are imposed upon.
crime. It is 'collateral' because it is not part of
Despite the hyperbole in its identification of "the real point of achieving a conviction," the Act represents an effort to get states
to look at their collateral consequences and
determine whether they can be eliminated or
reduced, and whether they can be tailored to
appropriately balance public safety with a former offender's need for employment, housing, and other benefits. The need for states
and the federal government to take a hard
look at collateral sanctions is demonstrated
by the American Bar Association's creation
of the National Inventory of the Collateral
Consequences of Conviction (NICCC).' The
NICCC demonstrates that there are tens of
thousands of collateral consequences through5

ABA National Inventory of the Collateral Conse-

quences of Conviction, http://www.abacollateralconsequences.
org(last visited May 17, 2015).

the direct sentence."7 That is the same basic
definition used in the NICCC. Yet, Section 2(2)
of the Act defines "collateral sanction" to mean
6
If a user of the website clicks on a state, at the bottom of each page, the user will learn that there are 46,523 total
entries, all but several thousand of which are collateral consequences. Attorney General Eric Holder has written to the Attorneys General of every state to encourage them to examine
the collateral consequences in their states with an eye to reducing or eliminating those that are unnecessary to protect public
safety. One of the reasons that the Department of Justice has
supported the NICCC is its judgment that many legislators and
law enforcement officials have too little knowledge as to the
overall impact of collateral consequences in their jurisdictions.
7
The Act, supra note 1, at 2.
8
ABA N.I.C.C.C, supra note 6, http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org/description. ("Persons convicted of
crime are subject to a wide variety of legal and regulatory
sanctions and restrictions in addition to the sentence imposed
by the court. These so- called 'collateral consequences' of

conviction ..

).
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"a penalty, disability, or disadvantage, however
denominated, imposed on an individual as a result of the individual's conviction of an offense
which applies by operation of law whether or not
the penalty disability or disadvantage is included
in thejudgment or sentence." (Emphasis added).9
The Act's definition of "collateral sanction" in Section 2 confuses both collateral
sanctions and sentencing sanctions, making it
impossible to know where the difference lies.
This definition contradicts the definition of
"collateral sanction" in the Prefatory Note and
needs clarification. Surely, nothing is more important in a model act than knowing precisely
what it covers. The confusion in the basic definition of a collateral sanction is exacerbated by
the Comment which states that the definition
in paragraph 2 is taken from Section 19-1.1 of
the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Collateral Sanctions and Discretionary Disqualification of Convicted Persons.o It turns out that
the statement is not exactly correct. Section 19i.i(a) of the ABA Standards provides: "the term
"collateral sanction" means a legal penalty, disability or disadvantage, however denominated,
that is imposed on a person automatically upon
that person's conviction for a felony, misdemeanor or other offense, even if it is not included in the sentence." The ABA Standard is
itself confusing because it fails to explain how
a sanction can be collateral if it is part of the
sentence. The ABA Standard may implicitly
say what the Act says explicitly. But, the Act
purports to deal with collateral consequences,
which it defines in Section i, (i) as "a collat-

The ABA
eral sanction or a disqualification."
Standards do not use the term "collateral
consequence" in the text of the Standards
and only use it in the Commentary." The
bottom line is that the Act needs to clarify
The Act § 2(2).
Id. § 2(2) cmt. at 8.
American Bar Association, ABA Standards for
11
Criminal Justice: Collateral Sanctions and Discretionary Disqualification of Convicted Persons, Standard 19-1.1(a) (3d ed.
2004).
The Act § 2(1).
12
9

10

13
ABA Standards for Collateral Sanctions,
supranote 12, at 7-13.
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol2/iss2/5
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what it means by colconsequences
lateral
and what it means by
sanctions.
collateral
Identification and
Collection of Laws
Regarding Collateral
Consequences
Section 4 of the Act states that a designated government agency or official shall identify all legal provisions that impose collateral
consequences or that authorize the imposition
of a disqualification resulting from or relating
to conviction for an offense." It would be difficult, if not impossible, for any official or agency to complete the task without knowing what
constitutes a collateral sanction and whether
sanctions imposed by courts as part of criminal judgments are direct or collateral sanctions.
Section 4(a)(4) of the Act states that in
performing the collection task the agency of
official "may rely on the study of this state's
collateral sanctions, disqualifications, and relief provisions prepared by the National Institute of Justice described in Section 51o of
the Court Security Improvement Act of 2007,
Pub. L. no- 177." The NICCC is that study.
Now that the NICCC has defined collateral consequence (including collateral sanction) as limited to matters not imposed in a
judgment of conviction, the Act should be
amended so that its definitions are consistent with the NICCC. Alternatively, the Act
should be amended to specify which consequences not included in the NICCC definition,
should be collected by the agency or official.
Improving Notice
Section 3 provides that if a state adopts
the Act as written, in the event of noncompliance with the Act's requirements, the noncompliance does not provide a basis for invalidating a plea, conviction, or sentence." This makes
§ 4(a)(1).

14

The Act

15

Id. § 3(a)(1).
4
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little sense if, in fact, the effect of collateral
consequences may be more devastating than
the penalties imposed by a court. Why should
there be no consequences for failing to assure
that the notice of collateral consequences required by Section 5 is provided to each defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere?' 6
There is no answer from the Commission, and
its failure to include a remedy for what it regards as a fundamentally important notice is
inconsistent with its recognition of the important ramifications of collateral consequences.

Pleas already states that defense counsel should
advise defendants of the collateral consequences of conviction." There is little reason why the
Act should not impose a similar requirement.
In Padilla . Kentucky, the United States
Supreme Court recognized that it was ineffective assistance of counsel for a defense counsel to fail to warn the defendant that a conviction would lead to deportation where that was
an obvious consequence of conviction.'9 The
end result was to impose a burden on defense

IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, FOR ANY OFFICIAL OR
AGENCY TO COMPLETE THE TASK WITHOUT KNOWING WHAT
CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL SANCTION AND WHETHER SANCTIONS
IMPOSED BY COURTS AS PART OF CRIMINAL JUDGMENTS ARE DIRECT
OR COLLATERAL SANCTIONS.
The Act does not provide which government agency or official will give the notice required by Section 5, and it is unclear which is
most likely to give effective notice. The question arises as to why defense counsel should
not be required to give the notice and to assure a court at the time of plea that it has been
given, and in the case of pro se litigants why the
court should not be required to give the notice.
This would ensure that there is a record that
notice has been given. If notice is not given,
there should be an opportunity for a defendant
to move to withdraw a plea in circumstances
where the collateral consequences may be more
severe than the penalty imposed by the court at
sentencing.7 ABA Standard 14-3.2(f) for Guilty

counsel and to provide a remedy for a defendant who was not properly advised by defense
counsel. The Act indicates that the drafters
were aware of the Padilla decision,0 and yet the
drafters imposed no burden on defense counsel to give warnings to defendants and provided no remedy for the failure to give warnings1
ofjudgments. Accordingly, there is strong reason not to upset
a plea for a technical deficiency in guilty plea procedure, and
this is the prevailing rule").
Referring to failure to advise about collateral consequences as a "technical deficiency" seems completely out
of place in a document that maintains that "it has become
increasingly difficult to avoid or mitigate the impact of collateral consequences," and that "[a]s a practical matter, in most
jurisdictions people convicted of a crime have no hope of ever
being able to fully discharge their debt to society." Id. at 4.
18
American Bar Association, ABA Standards for Crim-

16
See id. § 5(a)-(b) (stating requirements of the desinal Justice: Guilty Pleas, Standard 14-3.2(f) (3d ed. 1999).
ignated government agency or official and the court to give
19
559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010).
notice of collateral consequences in pretrial proceedings and at 20
The Act § 5 cmt. at 14.
the guilty plea, respectively).
21
It is true, as Justice Alito's concurrence points out
17
See id. § 5 cmt. at 17 (stating "[c]ompliance with
in Padilla,559 U.S. at 375-388, that it will not always be
this provision should be sufficiently simple, that questions
clear what exactly a defense counsel should be required to tell
of the consequences of non-compliance should rarely arise.
a defendant. But, as the Act suggests, there are some basic
However, the criminal justice system depends on the finality
warnings that can and should be provided in every case. The
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2014
Summer 2015
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Another defect in the Act is that Section
5(b) only requires the court to assure that the
defendant has received notice about collateral consequences when the defendant seeks to
plead guilty or nolo contendere. In fact, defendants who plead not guilty and seek to go to trial
may have every bit as much a need to know about
collateral consequences as those who plead
guilty because they may not understand that a
plea to a different charge might avoid certain
consequences that would result from a conviction at trial. If defense counsel were required to
give the notice to defendants before they pled,
the court would be able to assure itself that the
defendant's choice to plead not guilty is not a
result of ignorance of collateral consequences.
Similarly, a pro se defendant could be warned
by the court about collateral consequences
before entering a plea and could be given a
chance to reconsider whether to request counsel in order to better understand the relative
effects of entering a plea versus going to trial.
In addition to shifting the burden of
providing notice from some unidentified agency or official to defense counsel (or the court
in the case of pro se litigants), the Act should
be amended to improve the notice that is
provided at the time a plea is entered. Section 6 of the Act provides that at sentencing
or upon release from incarceration an individual should be provided the following notice:
(1) that collateral consequences may apply because of the
conviction;
(2) of the Internet address of the collaws
of
lection
under
published
Section 4(c);"2
same can be said of what a court should tell a pro se litigant.
The Act § 4(c) provides that the designated govern22
ment agency of official shall publish or cause to be published
the title and Internet address of the most recent publication of
the collateral consequences imposed by federal law and any
provision of federal law that may afford relief from a collateral
consequence.
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol2/iss2/5
Summer 2015
Washington College of Law
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(3) that there may be
ways to obtain relief
from collateral consequences;
(4) of contact information for government
or nonprofit agencies, groups, or organizations, if any,
offering assistance
to individuals seeking relief from collateral consequences; and
(5) of when an individual convicted of
an offense may vote
under this state's
law. 23
Section 5 already requires notice of (i) and
(2)

at the time of a guilty plea?.

Why not re-

quire the other information in (3), (4), and (5)
to be provided at the same time, and as suggested above, at the time of a not guilty plea
as well? The decision whether to plead and
incur one or more collateral consequences
might be affected by the potential opportunities later to obtain relief from a consequence.
There may be various entities better able than
a defense lawyer or a judge to assess the future probability of obtaining relief and that
may be willing, at least in some instances, to
offer an opinion on the prospects for future
relief before a defendant actually enters a plea.
The Act offers no justification for holding back this information until someone has
already been convicted or has already pled
guilty and is about to be sentenced. If the
information were provided prior to entry of
a plea, there is reason to question whether
there.~ would be a nee to re1eat it "s n Djai
The Act § 6(a).
23
Section 5 is entitled "Notice of Collateral Conse24
quences in Pretrial Proceeding and at Guilty Plea."
6
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of sentencing" as Section 6(b) now requires.
Section 6(c) requires that an unidentified
agency or official must also give the same notice required by Section 6(a) "not more than
[3o], and, if practicable, at least !io], days before

get or keep benefits
such as public housing or education;
* receiving a harsher sentence if you
are convicted of another offense in the
future;
* having the government take your
property; and

-~

-~.~M-

release."25 This makes little sense for an individual who is sentenced to ten, thirty or sixty
days in jail and has been given all the same
information at sentencing (or as I would require prior to pleading). It does make sense
to provide notice to someone who has served
a prison sentence of years because circumstances may have changed. The Act treats all
defendants alike regardless of how long they
serve any form of incarceration without explaining why repetitive notice is necessary.
If one assumes that repetitive notice is
a good thing, then the actual notice required
by the Act is defective and, surprisingly, deliberately so. The Comment to Section 6 states:
"[t]he notice contemplated by this section is
modest. It could be printed on a form issued
in the ordinary course of sentencing or processing an individual for release.""' The notice required by Section 5 of the Act for those
pleading guilty or nolo contendere requires
that the individual be warned of the possibility
of "deportation, removal, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of citizenship," and these additional consequences:
* being unable to
get or keep some licenses, permits, or

jobs;
* being unable to

* being unable to
vote or possess a
firearm97
Why would anyone who believes
that repetitive notice is necessary fail to
repeat the information that Section 5 indicates is important? The Act provides no
answer, and certainly the reason cannot be
financial. The Comment anticipates a form
that would be distributed to convicted and
incarcerated defendants. Such form certainly could include all the information required by Section 5 without increasing the
cost of the form to any appreciable extent.
Procedural Due Process
One of the most disappointing aspects of the Act is Section 8, entitled "Decision to Disqualify." This section governs
all disqualifications which Section 2(5) defines as "a penalty, disability, or disadvantage, however denominated, that an administrative agency, governmental official, or
court in a civil proceeding is authorized,
but not required, to impose on an individual on grounds relating to the individual's
conviction of an offense." The Act defines
"collateral sanctions" as the consequences
that are imposed by operation of law without the exercise of discretion by an agency
or official and distinguishes them from the
discretionary decisions covered by Sec-

25
The Act § 6(c).
26
The Act § 6 cmt. at 19.
27
Id. § 5(a).
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2014
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tion 8.28 The distinction is an important
part of the Act as evinced by Section 7(b),
which provides that "[a] law creating a collateral consequence that is ambiguous as
to whether it imposes a collateral sanction or authorizes a disqualification must
be construed as authorizing a disqualification." Having drawn the distinction be-

The decifense.
shall
sion-maker
also consider other
informarelevant
the
including
tion,
effect on third parties of granting the
benefit or oppor-

ONE OF THE MOST ISAPPOINTING ASPECTS OF THE ACT S
SECTION 8. ENTITLED "IECISION TO DISOUALFY."
tween automatic and discretionary consequences, Section 8 provides no opportunity
for the convicted person to be heard before
discretion is exercised. It simply states:
In deciding
whether to impose
a disqualification,
decision-maker
a
shall undertake an
individualized

Given the importance of collateral
consequences and the enormous impact they
can have on an individual, the denial of any
opportunity for the individual to be heard
before a decision is made is striking. The Act
strangely provides that the decision-maker
should consider "the effect on third parties
of granting the benefit or opportunity""o and
completely omits any requirement that the
decision-maker consider the effect on the in-

as-

sessment to determine whether the
benefit or opportunity at issue should
be denied the individual. In making
that decision, the
decision-maker may
consider, if substantially related to
the benefit or opportunity at issue:
the particular facts
and circumstances
involved in the offense, and the essential elements of
the offense. A conviction itself may
not be considered
except as having
established the elements of the of-

dividual who may be disqualified. At a minimum, the official or agency should be required
to give the individual some opportunity, preferably before a decision is made, to address
the decision-maker and to provide anything
the individual believes should be considered
relevant to the discretionary decision.' The
individual should have the opportunity to adId. § 8.
29
The Act § 8.
30
The Supreme Court has made clear that before dis31
qualifying a lawyer in a case for an alleged conflict of interest,
a judge has a duty to inquire about the conflict. Holloway v.
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978). The inquiry is intended to
protect the defendant, not the lawyer; the effect of a disqualification is to deny the defendant the benefit of the lawyer he or
she desires. The duty of inquiry is incorporated into Fed. R.
Crim. P. 44.

Id. § 2(2).
28
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol2/iss2/5
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been granted relief
such as an order of
limited relief or a
certificate of restoration of rights.9
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dress the impact that disqualification might
have on everyone who could be affected by
the decision whether or not to disqualify.2
The failure of the Act to provide any
opportunity for a convicted person to participate in the process leading to a discretionary decision is a major defect. Even if
there are circumstances in which a decision
must be made so quickly that a right to be
heard would not be practicable, the right to
appeal a decision could be a substitute and
still provide some opportunity for the person
affected by a disqualification to participate.
The Burden of Persuasion on Relief
Section io(a) of the Act provides that
an individual convicted of an offense may
petition for an order of limited relief from a
collateral sanction (i.e., a consequence automatically imposed by operation of law) to the
sentencing court at or before sentencing or
to a designated board or agency at any time
after sentencing. Section to (b) imposes the
burden on the petitioning individual to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that:
(1) granting the petition will materially assist the individual in obtaining
or maintaining
employment, education, housing,
public benefits, or
occupational licensing;
(2) the individual has
substantial need for
the relief requested
in order to live a
law-abiding life;
and

an unreasonable
risk to the safety
or welfare of the
public or any individual. 3
It makes some sense to impose the burden of proving (i) and (2) on the petition-

ing individual, and that burden should
be easy to meet in most cases since the
individual would not likely file a petition unless he or she believed that one
or more collateral consequences was
causing substantial problems related
to the items specified in (i). If the individual makes the showing as to (i), it

will be automatic or virtually so that the
individual also satisfies (2). But, there
is a strong argument that the burden
on (3) should be shifted to the government. This is not simply because proving a negative is often difficult, but it
is also because the government should
be required to identify the safety issue
about which it is concerned so that the
decision-maker can consider whether
there is a remedy short of leaving the collateral sanction in full effect that would
be adequate to protect public safety. 4
A similar argument for shifting
the burden can be made with respect
to Section n of the Act, entitled "Certificate of Restoration of Rights." That
Section provides that an individual may
seek a certificate of restoration of rights
after a certain period of years following
conviction or release from confinement.
It requires the individual to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that:

33
Id. § 10(b).
34
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §3142 (2008) (implicitly
imposing upon the government the burden in many instances
of showing that a defendant would pose a threat if released
pending trial). See also United States v Vortis, 785 F.2d 327,
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 841 (1986) (magistrate correctly found
(3) granting the petirisk of flight by a preponderance of the evidence). Of course,
tion would not pose
the statute deals with pretrial release while collateral conse32
The Comment to Section 8, like the Act itself, makes
quences affect those already convicted, but both address comno mention of a right to heard. Id. § 6 cmt. at 21-23.
munity safety.
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2014
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(1) the individual is
engaged in, or seeking to engage in, a
lawful occupation
or activity, including
employment, training,
education, or rehabilitative programs, or the
individual otherwise
has a lawful source of
support;
(2) the individual is not
in violation of the
terms of any criminal
sentence, or that any
failure to comply is
justified, excused,
involuntary, or insubstantial;

states that "[a] certificate of restoration

of rights must specify any restriction imposed and collateral sanction for which
relief has not been granted under Section i3(a)." Section i3(a) refers to petitions
filed pursuant to both Sections to and i
and contains a sentence stating that "[t]he
court may issue an order and the [designated board or agency] may issue an order
or certificate subject to restriction, condition, or additional requirement." This
appears to permit some intermediate approach, as the Comment to the Section
makes clear in the following language:
Section 3(a)
allows the grant of
relief
conditional
a
For example, Certificate of Restoration of Rights could
withhold the right
to seek public housing in the building
where the victim
lives, or could condition relief on participation in a rehabilitative program. If
relief is denied, reapplication can also
be conditioned. An
applicant could be
required to wait for
a period of time to
reapply, or to reapply only after Uditspecified rehabilitation or training.38

(3) a criminal charge is
not pending against
the individual; and
(4) granting the petition
would not pose an
unreasonable risk to
the safety or welfare
of the public or any
individual."
It seems fair to require the defendant to
prove (1), (2), and (3), but it would make
more sense to require the government
to prove (4). Neither the Comment to
Section 1o 6 nor the Comment to Section n " contains even a discussion of

the proper allocation of the burden of
persuasion. This is a glaring omission.
Another defect in the Act is that it
contains no specification as to who bears
the burden of persuasion with respect to
intermediate relief, which relieves some
but not all of the effects of a collateral
sanction or disqualification. Section n(c)
§ 11(b).

35

The Act

36

Id.

§ 10 cmt. at 28-30.

37

Id.

§ 11 cmt. at 31-32.
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Whose burden is it to suggest restrictions or conditions? And what is the
standard of proof? It seems that any
restrictions or conditions would be related to public safety and welfare concerns, which the government is better
positioned than an individual to address.
38

Id. § 13 cmt. at 35.
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Sanctions that Cannot Be Relieved
Section 12 of the Act states that
an order of limited relief (i.e., turning
a sanction into a disqualification) or a
certificate of restoration of rights may
not be issued to relieve collateral sanctions related to sex offender registration requirements, certain motor vehicle
sanctions, or ineligibility for employment in various law enforcement and
prosecutor offices. The motor vehicle
provision appears harmless as it is designed, as the Comment to Section 12
states, to avoid creating remedies that
are duplicative or inconsistent with already available remedies. 9 But, there is
nothing in the Comment that explains
why sex offender statutes and employment opportunities require insulation
from relief provisions. This is especially troublesome in view of the fact that
some states have such broad definitions
of sex offenses that they cover conduct
that other states would regard as harmless and would seem prime candidates
for relief from collateral consequences.o

A)

Conclusion

The Act is well intentioned and the
Commission deserves credit for recognizing both the important impact that collateral
consequences can have on the lives of individuals convicted of criminal acts and for emphasizing how great a contribution that the
NICCC has made and will continue to make
as legislators are called upon to revisit collateral consequences. According to the Commission's website, only Vermont has enacted
the Uniform Act. It is difficult to determine
whether other states have failed to move forward because they have not yet recognized
the significance of collateral consequences
or they have found the Act to be problematic
in at least some of the ways suggested here.
The Commission can always act to
improve the Act. The first step is recognizing the problems with it. Those problems
include inconsistency, incompleteness, and
questionable policy choices.
Reasonable
minds can debate the policy choices, but inconsistency and incompleteness are deficiencies that should not exist in a Uniform Act.

As for employment opportunities,
the Comment to Section 12 is inconsistent with the Act. The Comment states
"[n]othing in this Section prohibits states
from permitting law enforcement agencies to consider hiring individuals with
criminal records." 4' But, theActmakes the
collateral sanctions (i.e., automatic provisions by operation of law) that restrict
employment ineligible for relief, so there
is no way an agency can hire someone
who is legally barred from employment.

39
Id. § 12 cmt. at 32-33.
40
Joseph L. Lester, Off to Elba! The Legitimacy of Sex
Offender Residence and Employment Restrictions, 40 Akron
L. Rev. 339, 342 (2007) ("The definition of what is a sex offense is set forth by statute and varies from state to state. In
some states the list is short, while in others the list is extensive.").
41
The Act § 12 cmt. at 33.
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